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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRED D. HUDSON, dba Hudson Invest-
ment Co., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BETTIL YON'S INC., a corporation, dba 
Bettilyons Construction Company, 
Defendant and Respondant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10378 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff to collect 
funds due to him under a contract originally executed. 
between the Defendant and one Lynn Gowans, dba 
Structural Components Company, for installation of a 
roof structure on a building at 2220 South 2nd West, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. This contract was assigned by Lynn 
Gowans to the Plaintiff. The Defendant separately 1.Ulder-
took and agreed to make "all checks and payments due 
on the above job payable to Hudson Investment Company 
and Structural Components Company, together, and that 
no payments on this job would be made in any other 
manner.' The Plaintiff claims to be the beneficiary of 
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the orginal contract and accordingly to be entitled to the 
proceeds. The Plaintiff claims also to be entitled to its 
damages on a different legal theory, namely because the 
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a direct contractual 
relationship regarding the manner in which the checks 
would be made payable and that the breach of this con-
tractual agreement by the Defendant and respondant 
has given rise to the damages which the Plaintiff claims 
he is entiled to recover. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Judge 
Stewart M. Hanson issued a memorandum decision on 
March 25, 1965, denying to the Plaintiff his sought-after 
relief on the grounds that Gowans assigned the 
"earnings" only, that the Plaintiff was paid; and that in 
any event, the Defendant would be entiled to the benefit 
of Rule 13 (j) of the Utah State of Civil Procedure. The 
judgment of April 5, 1965, followed the same thinking 
as the memorandum decision and granted to the Def-
endant judgment of no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff seeks to have the judgment of the lower 
court reversed and to have judgment entered his favor 
and against the Defendant in pursuance of the prayer of 
his complaint together with the costs of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Based upon Exhibit 4, and not upon any independent 
knowledge of the Plaintiff, it appears that Bettilyon 
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Construction Company, the general contractor for Free-
way Industrial Park, had apparently undertaken to con-
struct an office and warehouse at 2220 South 2nd West 
' Salt Lake City, Utah. 
On or about the 28th day of September, 1962, Bettilyon 
Construction Company entered into a sub-contract agree-
ment with Lynn Gowans dba Structural Components 
Company, for the construction of a Glu-Lam roof 
structure, complete as "Shown on plans" and for furnish-
ing other items, and services as provided in Paragraph 
No. 2 of said agreement. The general contractor agreed to 
pay the sub-contractor the sum of $30,482.00 for his 
services. 
On or about the 25th day of October, 1962, the sub-
contractor ran short of cash and came to the Plaintiff 
to see if the Plaintiff would advance him some money. 
After exhibiting Exhibit D-4 to the Plaintiff, Mr. Gowans 
persuaded the Plaintiff, after some discussion, that a loan 
of $3,750.00, based upon the security of the sub-contract 
with Bettilyon's Inc. would be a sound investment. 
Mr. Gowans was not a credit-worthy individual, so the 
requested advance was initially declined, however, Mr. 
Gowans persisted and was successful in obtaining the 
signature of Mr. B. Lue Bettilyon on the document 
marked Exhibit P-9 in this case, entitled "Assignment 
of Earnings." After two or three attempts, Mr. Hudson 
was able to reach Mr. Bettilyon to verify that he, Mr. 
Bettilyon had signed this document. (P-9) 
Later on, a partial disbursement of $15,300.00 was 
made by Bettilyon's on the contract. The disbursing check 
(Exhibit D-2) was made payable to Structural Com-
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ponents and Hudson Investment Company, and upon 
Gowans insistance that he needed all of the money, he 
induced the Plaintiff to endorse the check to him without 
receiving any portion of the proceeds. The Plaintiff was 
assured that this $15,300.00 was only part payment; that 
it was needed to meet the payroll; that the job would be 
completed shortly and that the Plaintiff would be paid 
out of the final payment on the contract. (see page 6 of 
the transcript) The Plaintiff had already verified that no 
money previous to this check had been disbursed on the 
contract (see Page 4 of the Transcript). This would have 
meant that at the time the first check was released that 
there was $15,182.00 still owing on the contract to the 
Plaintiff and Gowans by the Defendant. 
Incidently, Gowans obtained an additional loan of 
$2,150.00 from the Plaintiff on November 29, 1962, in 
order to meet the payroll on this very job. Since this 
second note was paid directly by Gowans, by Mr. Gowan's 
check, it does not enter into this law suit, even though 
it was also secured by an assignment of the same contract. 
(See Exhibit D-10) 
There is in evidence (Exhibit D-8) a so-called "Notice 
of Lien." There may be two schools of thought as to 
whether this Exhibit is competent evidence to prove the 
facts which appear on its face. But giving the Defendant 
every benefit of the doubt, it appears that commencing at 
some time between November 12, 1962, and December 
12, 1962, the first and last dates mentioned on the Notice 
of Lien, that General Builders Supply Company, Inc., 
delivered some materials to Lynn Gowans which were 
used on the subject job for which Mr. Gowans did not 
pay completely. 
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Mr. Gowans paid off part of the lien himself, however, 
(See Transcript, Page 18, Line 5) because Bettilyons 
was able to get a full release of that lien from General 
Builders Supply for only $15,186.06. 
There is on the reverse side of the contract a paragraph, 
Number 13, which provides inter alia "the Subcontractor 
agrees to satisfy immediately any lien or encumbrance ... 
and to indemnify and save harmless the Contractor from 
and against any and all liens, suits, claims, actions, losses, 
costs, penalties, and damages of whatsoever kind of 
nature, including attorney's fees, etc." 
The reverse side of the contract bears no signature, 
also the phrase on the face of the contract which makes 
reference to the reverse side of the contract appears 
underneath the signatures of the parties. Whether or not 
the reverse side of the sub-contract agreement forms a 
part of the Bettilyons-Gowans contract, the Defendants 
are claiming the benefits Paragraph 13 of the same in 
avoiding payment to the Plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PARTIES INTENDED TRI-LATERALLY THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF WOULD BE THE JOINT PAYEE OF 
ALL GROSS PROCEEDS PAYABLE UNDER THE 
TERMS OF THE CONTRACT. 
Since this is a factual conclusion, no cases are cited. 
This proposition rests upon logic and good sense, and 
not law, and the only law that can be cited on this point 
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is that the courts will lend to words their ordinary and 
usual, not technical, meaning in interpreting contracts, 
and further that the intent of the parties may be derived 
from their over-all understanding and their actions as 
well as the singular meaning of words used in expressng 
an agreement. 
True, the asignment is couched in words which say that 
Gowans "assigned all my (his) earnings." Taken by 
itself, the word "earnings" lends itself to a variety of 
meanings. The agreement was drafted by laymen, ap-
parently by Mr. Gowans himself, to which Mr. Bettilyon 
added the second paragraph before signing. 
Had the parties used the words "gross receipts" or 
"net profit" there could be no room for argwnent, but 
since they didn't, the problem becomes one of second-
guessing the intent of the parties at the time the tran-
saction was negotiated. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "Earnings" as: 
"That which is earned; money earned; the price of 
services performed; reward; the reward of labor or 
the price of personal service performed, the reward 
for personal services, whether in money or chattels, 
the fruit or reward of labor; the fruits of the proper 
skill, experience, and industry; the gains of a person 
derived from his services or labor without the aid 
of capital; money or property gained or merited by 
labor; service, or the performance of something; that 
which is gained or merited by labor, services, or per-
formances. Saltzman v. City of Council Bluffs, 214 
Iowa 1033, 243, N. W. 161, 162." 
"Income" is synonymous with "earnings." State ex 
rel. Froedtert Grain and Malting Co. v. Tax Com-
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mission of Wisconsin, 221 Wis. 225, 265 N. W. 672, 
673, 104 A. L. R. 1478 (Emphasis mine) 
(Earnings are) 
"Either gross or net earnings" Springfield Coal 
Mining Co. v. Industrial Commision, 126 NE 133, 22 
ALR 859." 
Black's Law Dictionary goes on to cite cases which 
define "gross earnings" and which define "net earnings" 
but leaves us with the conclusion that the general term 
'earnings," means either gross or net earnings. Also, if 
"earnings" is synonymous with income, it is also synon-
ymous with receipts. 
Mr. B. Lue Bettilyon gave some interesting testimony 
to the effect that Mr. Gowans' profits on this job would 
be about 25% of the gross. However, this don't seem to 
be a factor at the time he issued the $15,300.00 check to 
Mr. Gowans and Mr. Hudson on December 20, 1962. The 
"net Profit" interpretation of "earnings" didn't seem to 
enter anyone's mind at this time, and having seen the 
willingness of Mr. Bettilyon to abide by his original 
agreement, Mr. Hudson was willing to wait for the 
second installment to get his money from Mr. Gowans. 
Obviously, each party is attempting, on hindsight, to per-
suade the court to adopt the meaning of "earnings" 
most favorable to its respective position, since the loser 
must look to Mr. Gowans to be made whole, and since 
Mr. Gowans has taken bankruptcy, the only hope of 
effecting a recovery is upon the basis that Mr. Gowans 
did not include Bettilyon's Inc. as one of his creditors, 
and that the indemnity agreement is still good, a fact 
not disclosed by the record. 
Furthermore, the "gross receipts" definition, as opposed 
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to the "net profit" definition of earnings, is bolstered by 
the somewhat redundant, but meaningul language of 
the next paragraph, which says that "Bettilyon Con-
struction Company agrees to make all checks and pay-
ments due on the above herein described job payable 
to Hudson Investment Company and Structural Com-
ponents Company, together, and that no payments on 
this job will be made in any other manner." (See Exhibit 
P-9) 
It will be argued later that this second paragraph 
forms an independent, enforceable contract, but for the 
purpose of clarifying this point, its importance is in 
lending emphasis to the intent of the parties that the 
gross proceeds would be paid to the joint order of the 
Plaintiff and Mr. Gowans. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS A SEPARATE, VALID, AND ENFORCE-
ABLE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND 
DEFENDANT IN THIS ACTION. 
Strangely enough, the obligor under the contract with 
Gowans obligated itself to the Plaintiff by an independent 
contract. This is not usual in assignment situations. All 
that usually happens is that the benefits of a contract 
are assigned, and the obligor is notified of the assignment. 
This is all that is necessary to vest in the assignee the 
rights of the assignor. However, in the instance, pro-
bably as an abundence of caution, the assignee, Fred D. 
Hudson, procured from B. Lue Bettilyon, the President 
of Bettilyon's Inc., not only an assent but also an indepen-
dent agreement that all (not just some) checks and pay-
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ments .... would be made payable to Husdon Investment 
Company and Structural Components Company together. 
All that is necessary to give rise to a cause of action 
to enforce such an agreement is the capacity of the parties 
to contract, a meeting of the minds, a valid consideration, 
a breach, and damages. All the elements of a separate 
contract are present here, and need not be belabored. 
The parties had an unquestioned abilty and capacity to 
contract. The meeting of the minds is in writing. The 
Plaintiff was induced to part with his money based upon 
the agreement with Bettilyon's, Inc., Bettilyons breached 
its contract to Hudson's damage, as claimed. 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFF NEVER RECEIVED PAYMENT OF 
THE NOTE IN QUESTION. 
The trial court held, as one of the reasons for its de-
cision, that the Plaintiff had been paid. The basis of this 
conclusion of fact is not entirely clear. It is possible that 
there was confusion about the fact that there were two 
notes. The second, smaller, note was admittedly paid. 
That isn't what this law suit is about. It is about the first 
note, the $3,750.00 note, not the $2,150.00 note. It could 
also be that some value is placed on the fact that Mr. 
Hudson endorsed the first $15,300.00 check. There is some 
confusion as to whether Mr. Husdon and Mr. Bettilyon 
made contact on this occasion (the contact with Mr. 
Bettilyon having been handled by Dave Watkiss, Mr. 
Hudson's attorney) but there can be no argument with 
the fact that Mr. Hudson received no part of the proceeds 
of the first check. Both Mr. Hudson and Mr. Gowas 
testified to that, and there is not one iota of evidence to 
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sustain a contrary position. This fact stands unrefuted. 
Payment or non-payment is a fact and is not something 
akin to hocus-pocus which may be inferred from en-
dorsement of a check. An endorsement may be some evi-
dence of payment, but certainly any presumptions that 
may arise therefrom are rebuttable, and having clearly 
rebutted the same, the fact of non-payment is unassail-
able. 
POINT IV 
THE PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY IS NOT BARRED BY 
RULE 13 (j) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE. 
Rule 13 (j) gives some protection to an obligor against 
the claims of an assignee if the obligor had a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross claim against the obligee-assignor 
at the time of or before the notice of assignment. No one 
argues with this proposition. It simply doesn't apply to 
the facts of this case. 
The Defendant argues that since Mr. Gowans didn't 
pay General Builders Supply Company, Inc. for some 
of the materials that were used on the job, that it had a 
claim against Mr. Gowans under paragraph 13 of the 
sub-contract agreement. While there may still be some 
argument as to whether the back side of this agreement, 
which begins with the caption "The Subcontractor 
Agrees as Follows", but which bears no signature, 
is a part of the contract, for the purpose of argument, 
assume that it does form a part of the agreement 
between Bettilyons and Mr. Gowans. The only defect 
in the Defendant's reasoning is the timing. The 
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cause of action by Bettilyon's against Mr. Gowans 
did not begin to accrue until November 12, 1962. They 
probably didn't know about their cause of action until 
the notice of lien was recorded on February 18, 1963, 
otherwise they wouldn't have paid Mr. Gowans 
$15,300.00 on December 20, 1962. Even then it is doubt-
ful. But sometime prior to April 8, 1963, they must have 
discovered it (the date of the release), and paid the same. 
Had Mr. Gowans not assigned his contract to Mr. Hudson 
and had Bettilyon's not agreed to make all checks jointly 
payable to Mr. Gowans and Mr. Hudson, there would be 
less question about the right of Bettilyons to withhold 
this money from Mr. Gowans. Even if their indemnific-
ation agreement were no good, they would be protected 
at common law by some other rule against any claims of 
Mr. Gowans. 
Here we have a different situation however. There 
are rights of third parties intervening. '.Dhat is the reason 
for the language of the rule, establishing a cut-off date 
for claims, etc., against the assignor. This cut-off date is 
the time of or before notice of assignment. A simple 
summary of the sequence of events will establish clearly 
that there was no set-off, claim, or counterclaim against 
Mr. Gowans at the time of the assignment. Mr. Hudson's 
transaction with Mr. Gowans and Bettilyons was on 
October 25, 1962. The cause of action in favor of Betti-
lyons against Mr. Gowans began to accrue on November 
12, 1962, and had not fully accrued until December 12, 
1962, and had not become a cause of action until Feb-
ruary 18, 1963. The counterclaim, even if valid, is simply 
too late to afford the Defendant any protection under 
Rule 13 (j). 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
trial court is erroneous on all three theories and that the 
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendants 
h 
John Elwood Dennett, Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
1243 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed 2 copies of the foregoing to Verden E. Betti-
lyon, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, 336 South 300 
East, Salt ity, Utah, this ........ Day of August, 1965. 
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